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Hard Questions About Soft Power:  
A Normative Outlook at Russia’s  
Foreign Policy
by Andrey Makarychev1
Political interest in the concept of  soft power, introduced to the international academic community a 
few decades ago, has recently been revitalized after a series of  mass uprisings in a number of  coun-
tries in North Africa and the Middle East. Arguably, the substantive issues raised by the Arab 
Spring cannot merely be reduced to either energy matters or to the application of  military force by 
the anti-Gaddafi coalition. The essence of  these developments is profoundly normative, and this is 
how they were perceived by most European analysts, who were keen to raise a set of  value-laden 
questions: how effective has the EU been as a “normative power” in its relations with neighbor-
ing autocratic regimes? Can other emerging powers—above all Turkey—become a better model 
for the Arab world? Can we expect the revolutionary virus to spread to other areas overwhelmed 
by authoritarian regimes, including the Caucasus and Central Asia? Against this dynamic back-
ground, it appears that the whole gamut of  soft power issues—including the role of  identities, 
norms, and values—will increasingly shape the EU’s complicated relations with its neighbors. The 
largest of  them, Russia, often seems to mimic Europe’s soft power, and yet paradoxically this has 
not brought Moscow and Brussels closer to each other.
Russia’s Soft Power: Imitating  
the West?
The concept of  soft power elucidates the impor-
tance of  immaterial policy tools (like the role of  
ideas, the power of  attraction, and symbols), as 
opposed to more well-known physical and mate-
rial instruments, including economic and military 
ones. The notion of  soft power, which to a sig-
nificant extent encompasses its predecessor—the 
idea of  public diplomacy—goes much farther and 
embeds not only technical tools of  either influenc-
ing or manipulating the policy-making machinery 
and public opinion in targeted countries, but also 
contains a strong normative potential which is 
unimaginable without an identification with certain 
political values. Indeed, soft power presupposes 
a value-laden identity capable of  setting certain 
standards of  social and political behavior, mostly 
based on externalizing successful domestic norms 
and projecting them beyond national borders. In 
this sense one may assume that the EU as well as 
its individual member states possess soft power 
resources, as epitomized by the Finnish “Northern 
Dimension” program or the Polish-Swedish “East-
ern Partnership” initiative.
Where does Russia stand among world actors who 
are eager to apply soft power techniques as part of  
their foreign policy? As one recent study assumes, 
Moscow has worked to effectively consolidate 
its influence in the post-Soviet area through soft 
power channels. The success of  Russia’s soft power 
activism in its neighborhood is due to an attractive 
visa-free travel policy, the rhetoric of  fraternity, and 
the ubiquity of  Russian media in most CIS coun-
tries.2 Though most Russians would certainly take 
such a suggestion as a compliment, I would assess 
Russia’s soft power potential with much more mod-
esty. Soft power is effective only if  its application 
generates and spreads positive social impulses and 
meanings. It is undeniable that the Russian labor 
market can be economically appealing to low-paid 
migrants from post-Soviet states, yet what counts is 
not the quantity of  immigrants and the volume of  
their remittances, but the qualitative characteristics 
of  their experiences in Russia, a country that is far 
from promoting integration and tolerance. Instead, 
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public attitudes towards immigrants all across Rus-
sia are characterized by estrangement, alienation, 
and enmity, which obviously do not create fertile 
ground for soft power. The fraternity narrative is 
very much past-oriented, lacks political dynamics, 
and thus fails to produce a convincing long-term 
vision of  a common future. As for the Russian 
media beyond Russian borders, it mainly translates 
commercial entertainment products and lacks 
strong political messages. Even if  these messages 
become discernible, many of  them are perceived as 
derogatory by neighboring countries that are too 
often depicted by Russian journalists as unstable 
and insolvent troublemakers.
In the meantime, while some might assess the state 
of  Russian soft power in positivist terms (i. e. as 
either decreasing or increasing), I have a different 
outlook. Russia did recognize the importance of  
soft power as a—perhaps auxiliary and faculta-
tive—ingredient of  diplomacy, which by itself  is a 
serious step forward when one takes into account 
the legacy of  the overwhelmingly materialist and 
technocratic thinking that dominates in the Krem-
lin. In the traditions of  the Soviet mentality, most 
Russian policy makers perhaps view soft power 
as a “Western invention,” or even as an element 
of  what in the Cold War was dubbed “ideological 
warfare” to which Russia has to respond somehow. 
Such an attitude has made Russia’s first steps in 
the soft power terrain overtly imitative and reactive 
both in form (the establishment of  the Institute 
for Democracy and Cooperation—IDC3—with 
two foreign offices in Paris and New York, was 
a mimetic gesture by the Kremlin in response to 
American and European foundations operating in 
Russia) and in substance (Russia’s soft power nar-
rative addressed to the post-Soviet elites is consti-
tuted by an overt and inevitable “contrast” between 
a Russian-led—and still quite hypothetical—model 
of  integration on the one hand, and the existing 
Western institutions, including the EU and NATO, 
on the other). Yet these endeavors are far from 
effective: the two branches of  IDC are overwhelm-
ingly perceived as propaganda platforms rather 
than as intellectual think tanks; while the attempts 
to lure neighboring countries by offering them “full 
sovereignty,” as opposed to the alleged dissolu-
tion of  their sovereignties in case of  both EU and 
NATO membership, are equally unworkable and 
counter-productive. In countries like Moldova and 
Ukraine at least, Russia’s clumsy attempts to switch 
to the language of  soft power tend to produce the 
opposite of  the results expected by the Kremlin’s 
spin-doctors.
Russian Soft Power:  
Three Major Concepts
Yet it would be erroneous to discard Russia’s ability 
to play soft power games of  its own. The opera-
tionalization of  soft power is a learning process 
that Russia is now experiencing—albeit slowly and 
controversially. Since soft power is an ideational 
phenomenon, it has to be analyzed as part of  a set 
of  politically instrumentalizable concepts. Three 
of  them can be singled out as the core ideas that 
shape the contours of  Russian soft power: selective 
pro-democracy rhetoric, the idea of  a democratiza-
tion of  international relations, and a variety of  civi-
lizational approaches.
First, Russia adheres to selective pro-democracy 
rhetoric mostly in its relations with countries that 
display an explicit pro-Western orientation. The 
most illustrative examples are perhaps Ukraine 
and Georgia following their “color revolutions”: 
the Kremlin rebuffed Kiev’s plans to join NATO 
not only as contravening Russian interests, but 
also as “undemocratic” due to the deficit of  
popular support among Ukrainians. In the same 
vein, the Kremlin dubbed the Saakashvili regime 
in Georgia “undemocratic” because of  its alleged 
oppression against the opposition and suppres-
sion of  ethnic minorities. Preceding this, Moscow 
had started to question the Baltic states’ adherence 
to democratic norms that, in Russian eyes, fails 
to guarantee European democratic standards for 
Russian-speaking groups. Much less pronounced 
is the role of  pro-democracy discourse in Russia’s 
communicative relations with less Westernized 
countries; thus, Moscow only sporadically raised 
the issue of  the authoritarian nature of  Alexander 
Lukashenko’s regime in Belarus (basically using 
mass media for delivering its messages), and quite 
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pragmatically called the overthrow of  Kurmanbek 
Bakiev’s regime in Kyrgyzstan a legitimate form of  
popular protest against corrupt and oppressive rule. 
In the meantime, Russia seldom raised the issue of  
democracy in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
Moldova, Turkmenistan, or Uzbekistan, as well 
as the break-away territories of  Abkhazia, South 
Ossetia, Transnistria, or Nagorno-Karabakh. 
Second, Russia has tried to make its foreign policy 
more attractive to the non-Western world through 
the idea of  democratizing the international political 
scene, as epitomized by the concept of  democratic 
multipolarity. In accordance to its logic, the ideal of  
a plurality of  power holders is re-signified as not 
only part of  an old realist approach, but also as an 
appealing normative value. According to the Krem-
lin’s vision, unipolarity is authoritarian, while multi-
polarity is democratic. This is certainly an explicitly 
ideological conception, since it requires the tacit 
dethroning of  the West from the global normative 
pedestal.
In this reading, democracy appears to be void of  
political meanings and reduced to the mere multi-
plicity of  sovereign states, regardless of  the internal 
nature of  their political regimes. Not incidentally, 
Russia uses the “democratic multipolarity” rhetoric 
when dealing with countries like China, Belarus, 
Iran, Venezuela, India, and Cuba, most of  which 
lack a convincing record of  domestic democratic 
rule. “Democratic multipolarity” thus makes the 
issues of  liberty, free competition, and other core 
elements of  democracy either irrelevant or equally 
acceptable along with authoritarianism, totalitarian-
ism, a non-market economy, etc.
Yet the Kremlin also employs the idea of  interna-
tional democracy in a quite different context. Thus, 
according to its 2008 Foreign Policy Concept, Rus-
sia’s policy goal in Europe is not any type of  order, 
but a “genuinely open and democratic system of  
collective security.”4 There are two conceptual 
problems with this statement. First, it to some 
extent disavows the logic of  “democratic multipo-
larity” by arguing that not only pluralism, but soli-
darism (normative conformity in the security field) 
can also be democratic provided that it serves Rus-
sia’s interest in being accepted as an equal power to 
its Western partners. Besides, the Kremlin’s under-
standing of  the security-democracy nexus diverges 
significantly from the views dominating in the West, 
where it necessarily involves the issues of  develop-
ment, human rights protection, public oversight of  
military and security institutions, etc.
Third, Russia tries to make use of  the concept of  
a dialogue of  civilizations that has more than one 
meaning. The most typical political articulation can 
be found in Dmitry Medvedev’s reference to the 
European Union, the United States, and Russia as 
three branches of  European civilization destined to 
cooperate closely with each other. Therefore, both 
the unity of  a wider European civilization and the 
compatibility of  its different territorial parts are 
taken almost for granted, which relieves Russia of  
improving its institutional performance and making 
binding commitments aimed at facilitating a painful 
Europeanization process. Instead, Moscow prefers 
the policy of  convincing the West to accept Rus-
sia’s historical membership in the presumably com-
mon European civilization.
Yet academic discourses offer a much more varied 
panoply of  views that seem to be in disharmony 
with the political discourse in two very significant 
regards—not all of  them depart from a state-cen-
tric platform, and not all are that friendly towards 
the West. It is remarkable that some versions of  
civilization-based discourse articulate a certain 
mistrust of  the state. The plurality of  civilizations 
as a particular case of  normative plurality makes 
references to states indispensable. Civilizational 
resources are believed to be relatively independent 
of  political elites, and are viewed as compensating 
for Russia’s weakness as a nation. This reasoning 
sounds quite in tune with the anticipations of  grad-
ual transformations in political subjectivity—from 
nation states to a type of  new multi-nodal com-
posite actors based upon durable communications 
between culturally, religiously, and linguistically 
related communities.
Much less admirable are disagreements with Rus-
sia’s role as an inalienable part of  an integral all-
European civilization among experts in Russia. In 
the case of  such denial, the civilizational discourse, 
instead of  playing the role of  a soft power con-
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nector, turns into a deliberately vast container of  
the most parochial and extremely mythologized 
perceptions of  Russia’s historical self. Moreover, 
the articulation of  Russia’s cultural peculiarity can 
be instrumental in de-actualizing a broad variety of  
the most acute social and administrative problems 
in Russia and its civilizational neighbors (Ukraine 
and Belarus), including corruption, the lack of  rule 
of  law, mismanagement, authoritarian trends in 
politics, etc.
In the Russian academic literature one may find at 
least two practical implementations of  the civiliza-
tional approach. Both look very dubious from the 
soft power vantage point. One example is BRICS, 
a group of  countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, 
and South Africa) that, according to some Russian 
commentators, embodies not only economic ratio-
nale but also a sort of  “dialogue” of  civilizational 
cores. However, in spite of  this optimism, it is the 
soft power dimension that is lacking in the whole 
concept of  BRICS, which by now represents a 
loosely tied association of  economic partners with 
strong power ambitions and minimal normative 
potential.
Another practical example of  this civilization-based 
worldview is the “Russian world” concept, which 
again is a matter of  different interpretations. The 
Russian Orthodox Church sees it as a predomi-
nantly religious concept, while for the Kremlin and 
the Russkiy Mir Foundation5 it serves as a tool for 
projecting Russia’s cultural and political influence 
abroad. Yet blueprints often differ from the admin-
istrative practices of  the Russian state, which when 
faced with a choice between soft power and mate-
rial gains usually gives preference to the latter. This 
was clearly illustrated by the deep conflict between 
the Russian state and the Russian community of  
Côte-d’Azur, France, provoked by a series of  legal 
actions initiated by the presidential administration 
in Moscow in order to reinstitute the ownership of  
the largest Orthodox church in Nice. The French 
court has taken the Kremlin’s side in the dispute, 
which resulted in a de-facto confrontation between 
Moscow and the Russian diaspora.6
This particular incident only substantiates those 
sociological observations that claim that language 
as such is an insufficient factor for cementing Rus-
sia’s soft power in countries with large numbers of  
“compatriots living abroad.” As a Russian author 
claims, Russian-speaking communities in the West 
regard the Soviet times not as an organic part of  
the Russian civilizational history, but as a deviation 
from it. Concomitantly, they question the political 
relevance of  the ideas of  continuity and succes-
sion, as well as the legitimacy of  the Soviet-Russian 
social and administrative mix that appears to be 
constitutive for the current Russian state. This 
means that the cultural symbols cultivated from 
above diverge from those attitudes that dominate 
in the milieu of  Russian émigré communities.7 This 
is also the case of  Russian-speakers in neighboring 
countries, including the Baltic States, which remain 
relatively immune to the politically motivated proj-
ects sponsored by Moscow. As for countries like 
Moldova, the Russian version of  “cultural diplo-
macy” has triggered a malign effect in the form of  
activities of  local groups that are ironically dubbed 
“professional Russians” for their pragmatic exploita-
tion of  Moscow’s disbursement of  large sums of  
money aimed at patronizing ethnic Russians.
Who Are the Addressees?
Who are the addressees of  this type of  highly 
selective and pragmatic soft power discourse? 
There are three possible answers to this question. 
First, one may argue that Russia uses normative 
arguments to substantiate its power positions vis-
à-vis CIS neighbors. Therefore, Russia seeks to get 
positive feedback from—and thus exercise influ-
ence among—post-Soviet elites, utilizing multiple 
and sometimes misplaced references to their “com-
mon history” and shared Soviet pedigree. The key 
problem here is both mental and organizational, 
and it boils down to the unfortunate Soviet tradi-
tion of  dividing political and intellectual elites 
into “pro-Western” and “pro-Russian” segments. 
My personal experience of  shortly working with 
Priznanie Foundation8 in Moldova in 2009 strongly 
confirms this view. The deficiency of  this “black-
and-white” approach becomes an obvious obstacle 
for Russian policy towards Georgia, which simply 
lacks any “pro-Russian” candidates for the highest 
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administrative positions, at least according to Rus-
sian standards. “Post-Orange” Ukraine sheds even 
more doubts on the practicality of  differentiating 
between “pro-Russian” and “pro-Western” politi-
cians: Viktor Yanukovich, who before his acces-
sion to presidency was almost entirely presented 
as belonging to the first category, in less than a 
year made not only a number of  explicitly pro-
European gestures, but even initiated the process 
of  abrogating gas agreements with Russia signed by 
his predecessors.
Second, Russia is keen to resort to soft power 
rhetoric in communicating with the political elites 
of  countries that have positioned themselves as 
alternatives to the domination of  the West, includ-
ing China, India, Brazil, Venezuela, Iran, Turkey, etc. 
Since Russia has to somehow attune its discourse 
to the political ideologies of  the non-Western 
world, and some of  its soft power moves converge 
with post-colonial discourse with its resistance to 
the domination of  the West and the longing for 
more equitable relations among state actors.
Third, soft power may constitute a meaningful ele-
ment of  Russia’s drive for recognition from Europe. 
That is why Russia wants to be equal to the West, 
including in the normative domain. Seen from this 
angle, the important addressee of  Russia’s soft 
power messages are political elites in both Europe 
and America. A good example here is the Krem-
lin’s attack on those post-Soviet and post-socialist 
authorities that it accuses of  “re-writing the history 
of  the Second World War” as the heroic script of  
liberating Eastern European peoples from fascism. 
In posing as a “defender” of  the normative order 
based on an anti-Nazi consensus, Moscow not only 
tries to reach policy makers in Central European 
and Baltic countries, but above all to remind major 
EU member states that even the Stalin-led Soviet 
Union was a legitimate partner of  today’s Euro-
Atlantic security institutions.
Yet Russia’s strategy of  postulating its European 
identity won’t bear any fruit unless Moscow starts 
seriously integrating into the normative order 
that has emerged in the West since the fall of  the 
Berlin Wall. What dramatically hinders all Russian 
attempts to activate its soft power tools is Mos-
cow’s visible disengagement from the core domains 
of  this normative order. Two examples seem to 
be quite illustrative at this juncture. One is Russia’s 
skeptical attitude towards the concept of  human 
security that is still perceived in the Kremlin as an 
alien and unnecessary policy propagated by the 
West. Another example is Russia’s disinterest in 
joining the international normative mechanisms 
aimed at promoting economic transparency and 
financial accountability, which is increasingly impor-
tant from the European perspective. In particular, 
Russia showed no interest in the Extractive Indus-
try Transparency Initiative in which dozens of  
oil- and gas-producing and transporting countries, 
including many of  Russia’s neighbors (Kazakhstan, 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Mongolia), have taken 
part. Against this backdrop, the normative discon-
nections between Russia and Europe are likely to 
stay profoundly divisive in the foreseeable future, 
a situation which will keep constraining Russia’s 
soft power potential and depriving Russia of  policy 
leverage in wider Europe, including its near abroad.
Conclusion
As this brief  analysis has shown, Russia tends to 
apply soft power quite selectively and pragmati-
cally. In some cases, Russia’s sporadic usage of  
pro-democracy rhetoric is aimed at pressuring the 
leaders of  adjacent countries and making them 
more compliant to Russian economic and security 
demands. Yet in questioning the democratic cre-
dentials of  Ukraine under former President Viktor 
Yuschenko and Georgia under President Mikhail 
Saakashvili, Russia was playing a more compli-
cated game: apart from exerting pressure upon 
the governments that resulted from the “colour 
revolutions,” the Kremlin was eager to demonstrate 
their mismatch with the European standards of  
democracy and thus to reproach both the EU and 
NATO for giving them support. The same goes for 
Russia’s devotion to democracy-grounded rhetoric 
in its relations with the three Baltic countries that is 
aimed at unveiling their adherence to “non-Euro-
pean” minority policies.
What the European countries can do in this situ-
ation is perhaps to stimulate public debates with 
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Russian interlocutors on the most successful 
examples of  soft power as an indispensable instru-
ment of  tackling political and security challenges, 
including peacemaking and conflict resolution. The 
EU member states may also be instrumental in 
fostering professional discussions on the normative 
principles that are constitutive for European iden-
tity which Russia is so desperately eager to share. 
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